Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem by M Nagendra Prasad

Author:M Nagendra Prasad [Prasad, M Nagendra]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, General, Sociology
ISBN: 9781351756747
Google: Qx8uDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 35866974
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2017-07-12T00:00:00+00:00

4 Jakarta Informal Meetings, 1988–1989

Jakarta’s untiring efforts at finding a peaceful solution to the Kampuchean question had profound influence on the parties concerned which, though hesitated initially, approved of the ‘Cocktail Party’ framework ultimately. Besides the change in the attitude of the major powers, the perseverance of the ASEAN and other international developments brightened the prospects of the resolution of the Kampuchean problem. For their part, the major powers as Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond pointed out, were making efforts “to mitigate their international rivalries in order to turn to economic expansion”1 and felt the need to pursue a “policy of cooperation” instead of a “policy of confrontation”. The impact of this was seen in the adoption of a flexible attitude towards regional conflicts. Especially, the suppleness of Gorbachev’s peace initiatives paved the way for the “USSR-PRC rapprochement”, which in turn fostered a new geo-political calculus in Indochina and pressurised Hanoi to work for an early resolution of the Cambodian problem by withdrawing its troops from Cambodia. The PRC could not but soften its attitude and prevail upon its protege Khmer Rouge, to extend its cooperation in the peace process. For want of an alternative, the Khmer Rouge, hitherto preoccupied with the policy of “bleeding Vietnam white” so that Hanoi “will meet its Vietnam” in Kampuchea, consented to taking part in the ‘Cocktail Pary’2 which was also called Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM). Nonetheless, Hun Sen had pointed out the inherent difficulty in contemplating peace after excessive bloodshed.3

As the congenial environment was beginning to prevail, certain events which threatened to undermine the proposed JIM were noticed. In a Joint Statement4 issued on July 3, 1988 exclusively on the JIM, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, while emphasising “the importance of the upcoming JIM as a focal point in the search for the long-awaited political settlement of the Kampuchean problem”, expressed “ASEAN’s full support for the Jakarta Informal Meeting which has as its objective the bringing together of the parties concerned to try to resolve the Kampuchean problem”. Welcoming the inclination of Vietnam and all Khmer factions to participate in the JIM, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed hope that “Vietnam’s and Kampuchean factions’ active involvement and positive contribution would serve to advance the cause of peace in Kampuchea”. Again, in a Joint Communique issued two days later at the end of the 21st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers called on the four Khmer factions and Vietnam “to support, participate and endeavour in making the projected Jakarta Informal Meeting a success”.5 The ASEAN Joint Communique had sparked much debate and disagreement. The Indochina states and Vietnam in particular, misunderstood and misinterpreted the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ call. They felt that ASEAN insisted on Vietnam’s participation in the first phase of the informal talks itself. At their extraordinary conference held on July 11, 1988 in Phnom Penh, the Indochinese Foreign Ministers, while expressing their “readiness” to attend the proposed JIM talks, pointed out that the ASEAN states’ desire that the SRV ought to

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